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This study examines the extent to which stakeholders’ demands are represented by the 
Commission, European Parliament, and national governments in the Council when legislative 
proposals are debated. We formulate and test propositions from resource exchange theory to 
explain variation in the responsiveness of EU actors to various stakeholders. Our research 
design integrates the study of the formative and decision-making stages of the legislative 
process, which are often studied in isolation. We combine new information from detailed 
qualitative content analysis of consultation documents with an established dataset on 
subsequent legislative decision-making. The findings indicate that a broad range of 
stakeholders’ demands are reflected in the positions taken by the national and supranational 
actors involved in the EU’s legislative process, but also considerable variation in the extent to 
which different EU actors respond to stakeholders of different types and origins. 
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The procedural legitimacy of democracy rests partly on the idea that policymakers consider 
the range of interests that are affected by policy proposals before reaching final decisions. 
Although there is no consensus about what an ‘unbiased interest system’ looks like, most 
scholars agree that a broad range of interests should be represented, none should be 
systematically excluded, and none should determine the contents of legislative outputs to the 
exclusion of others (Richardson ed. 1982; 2012; Lowery et al. 2015). This paper examines 
the extent to which actors involved in the European Union’s legislative process – the 
Commission, member states in the Council and the European Parliament – respond to a broad 
range of interests when they discuss legislative proposals. The responsiveness of EU actors is 
a key question in the debate concerning the EU’s democratic deficit since critics often claim 
that the EU is biased toward or against certain interests, particularly business interests.  
We present new evidence that links the formative stage prior to the introduction of 
legislative proposals with the decision stage after the introduction of legislative proposals. 
This integrated analysis of the formative and decision stages is important, because these are 
often examined in two distinct subfields in EU studies despite calls to integrate them (Beyers 
et al. 2015; Dür et al. 2015). We conceptualize the formative stage as a stage between the 
‘agenda-setting’ and ‘decision’ stages of the legislative process, in line with previous 
research on interest representation in the EU (e.g. Klüver 2013; Bunea and Thomson 2015). 
The formative stage occurs before the Commission issues a legislative proposal, but is 
distinct from the agenda-setting stage in that the issues and at least some policy alternatives 
for discussion have already been identified in the Commission’s consultation call. 
Stakeholders are actively consulted during the formative stage and are can introduce new 
issues or policy alternatives in their submissions that respond to the Commission’s 
consultation call. By examining the congruence between stakeholders’ demands from the 
consultations during the formative stage and EU actors’ positions during the subsequent 
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decision stage on the same issues, we are able to identify possible biases in the system of 
interest representation. 
 
Policy responsiveness and resource exchange 
 
Our main theoretical interest is the responsiveness of EU actors to various stakeholders’ 
demands. 1  Responsiveness is the degree to which legislative actors are influenced by 
stakeholders’ expressed interests, such that legislators act in ways that further the interests of 
those stakeholders. We examine responsiveness by examining congruence, which is simply 
the degree of similarity between legislators’ policy positions and stakeholders’ policy 
demands. It is reasonable to assume that greater responsiveness is generally associated with 
more congruence, but responsiveness and congruence are not the same thing. A legislative 
actor may be responsive to a stakeholder without perfectly reflecting that stakeholder’s policy 
demands. Instead, the legislator may represent that stakeholder’s broader interests and 
concerns without supporting the specific policy alternatives advocated by the stakeholder. 
Likewise, congruence between a legislator and a stakeholder’s policy positions could occur 
for reasons other than responsiveness of the former to the latter. For instance, both legislators 
and stakeholders may be influenced by the same third actor, or legislators may influence 
stakeholders. A similar distinction between responsiveness and congruence has been noted in 
research on the relationship between the policy positions of political parties and citizens (e.g. 
Adams et al. 2006). Acknowledging distinction between our theoretical interest and empirical 
focus enables us to gauge the level of uncertainty associated with our inferences, a point to 
which we return in the conclusions. 
 Our expectations about variation in responsiveness are derived from resource 
                                                        
1 We refer to ‘stakeholders’ because we include all organisations that responded to open 
consultation calls, regardless of whether they are interest groups.  
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exchange theory (Bouwen, 2002; 2004; Mazey and Richardson 2006). This theory explains 
the level of access that legislative actors provide to stakeholders based on the fit between 
legislators’ needs and what stakeholders have to offer. There are two main types of resource 
that stakeholders can supply to legislative actors in exchange for access. The first is policy-
relevant information, which takes the form of specialised technical information about a 
sector. The second is information about the levels of support among different constituencies 
for the policy positions that legislative actors may adopt. This includes information about the 
interests of various industries and lobbying communities that are active within a sector, at 
both an EU and national level (Bouwen 2002: 370), and public opinion (Kohler-Koch and 
Finke 2007: 206-211; Klüver 2013: 62-63).  
Six hypotheses structure our analyses. The first three posit general variation in the 
level of responsiveness by legislative actor (Commission, EP and member states), by the 
origin of stakeholders (national, EU-wide and non-EU), and by the type of stakeholder 
(business groups, NGOs etc.). The second three hypotheses posit more specific variation in 
responsiveness by each of the legislative actors depending on their representative mandate. 
We expect the Commission to be the most responsive of the actors involved in the 
legislative process. Its demand for policy-relevant information is high due to its relatively 
small staff and the wide range of sectors in which it develops legislative proposals (Bouwen 
2002: 379-380; Klüver 2013: 62). In addition, as the EU actor with the weakest claim to hold 
a democratic mandate, the Commission has an incentive to consult widely to bolster its 
legitimacy (Bunea and Thomson 2015). Research on lobbying also suggests that the 
Commission is the most important access point for stakeholders seeking to influence the 
legislative process, particularly during the formative stage of the legislative process (Eising 
2007: 387). These theoretical and empirical considerations support the following hypothesis: 
H1: The Commission is more responsive to the policy demands of all stakeholders than are 
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the European Parliament or national governments. 
 Business interests often have particularly valuable information resources, as well as 
financial resources, to secure access to and responses from policymakers. Working from a 
resource exchange perspective, Klüver suggests that EU legislative actors are particularly 
responsive to stakeholders that hold economic power at either a domestic or European level 
(2013: 63). Business stakeholders often offer credible policy-relevant information about the 
impact of alternative regulations on economic growth and competitiveness. The literature on 
interest representation in the EU suggests that business interests are particularly active in 
lobbying in the EU and that there may be a bias in the system toward business interests 
(Cowles 1995; Beyers 2002; Dür and de Bièvre 2007; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014). We 
therefore examine whether: 
H2: All legislative actors are more responsive to the policy demands of business stakeholders 
(associations and individual firms) than to demands expressed by other types of stakeholder. 
We distinguish between stakeholders in terms of their origin: EU-wide, national 
(within the EU), and non-EU. It is perhaps surprising that non-EU stakeholders also 
participate in consultations and attempt to influence the EU legislative process. In a previous 
large-n study of a broad range of consultations held between 2001 and 2010, Rasmussen and 
Alexandrova (2012) found substantial levels of participation from non-EU stakeholders, 
particularly from countries with high levels of trade with the EU. Since none of the 
legislative actors has an obvious mandate to represent the interests of non-EU stakeholders 
we expect that: 
H3: All legislative actors are more responsive to the policy demands of EU-wide and 
national stakeholders than to demands expressed by non-EU stakeholders. 
The three following expectations focus on the representative mandate of the EU 
actors. These mandates are central to the legitimacy claims of each legislative actor and to 
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their institutional design. The Commission is a supranational actor that is required by the 
treaties to represent the European interest as distinct from national or sectoral interests 
(Pollack 1998; Bouwen 2002: 379). Research on the Commission’s policy positions relative 
to national governments, and on the roles played by individual commissioners, highlights the 
importance of this supranational status, notwithstanding residual effects of nationality and 
ideological affiliations of commissioners (Crombez 1997; Hooghe 2005; Egeberg 2006; 
Wonka 2007; Thomson 2011: 79). Therefore, we expect the Commission to be particularly 
receptive to EU-wide interests:  
H4: The Commission is more responsive to the policy demands of EU-wide stakeholders 
than to the demands expressed by other groups. 
The European Parliament is a supranational legislator with cohesive transnational 
party groupings that are broadly pro-integration (Hix et al. 2007; McElroy and Benoit 2012). 
It therefore has at least a minimal mandate to represent broad EU interests. As a result, the 
primary access good it demands from stakeholders is information about the encompassing 
European interest. This suggests that the EP might behave similarly to the Commission with 
respect to its responsiveness to EU-wide interests: 
H5: The European Parliament is more responsive to the policy demands of EU-wide 
stakeholders than to demands expressed by other groups. 
As with the previous hypothesis on the Commission, evidence for this proposition is far from 
a foregone conclusion. Nationality plays an important role in structuring the careers and 
therefore behaviour of MEPs, as well as the management of EP business, and national 
governments and domestic interest groups still attempt to influence ‘their’ MEPs (Raunio 
2000; Kreppel 2002: 202-5; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; Whitaker 2005; Costello and 
Thomson 2014). 
The mandate of each of the member states in the Council clearly prioritises nationally 
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based interests. From the perspective of resource exchange theory, national governments 
need information that is specific to their own territories on the social and economic impact of 
proposed policies and the support for policies among key stakeholders and the general public. 
In line with this assumption, case studies of position taking by member states on legislative 
proposals provide many high-profile examples of the relevance of domestic sectoral interests 
(Thomson 2011: 132). For instance: the German government’s positions on proposed car 
emission standards reflected German car manufacturers’ interests; the French governments’ 
positions on proposed regulations for wine reflected domestic wine producers’ interests; and 
the British government’s positions on proposed banking regulations reflected the interests of 
the UK’s large financial services sector. The implication of this for the congruence between 
stakeholders’ demands and national governments’ positions is the following expectation: 
H6: National governments are more responsive to the policy demands of stakeholders from 
their own state than to demands expressed by stakeholders from other states, EU-wide 
interests, or non-EU interests. 
These expectations do not exhaust all possible sources of bias in the EU’s system of 
interest representation, or the various channels of responsiveness that may exist. For instance, 
party groupings within the EP and individual Commissioners within the Commission may 
also be more or less responsive to different stakeholders. However, the positions of the EP 
and Commission largely feed into the inter-institutional legislative process as those of 
collective actors, which makes it relevant to examine their collective policy positions. Our 
analyses will control for other characteristics of stakeholders and EU actors. We distinguish 
between stakeholders that are individual organisations and those that are associations of 
organisations, since the latter may hold a more convincing claim to represent a broad range of 
interests. We also distinguish between stakeholders that have an office in Brussels and those 
that do not, since the presence of a Brussels office may indicate a more sustained level of 
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engagement with EU policymaking. With respect to member states’ characteristics, we report 
some robustness tests in which we include measures of the left-right positions of national 
governments. We do not expect government ideology to play a significant role, since this 
generally plays a weak role in defining the positions taken by member states in the Council. 
 
Research design 
 
We selected consultations relating to 12 legislative proposals that were subsequently 
introduced by the Commission. These 12 proposals are the legislative proposals from the 
DEU II dataset that were discussed by the Commission, Council and EP after the 2004 
enlargement, and for which the documents submitted by stakeholders to relevant 
consultations were available through transparency requests. The DEU II dataset was the basis 
of our selection, because it contains detailed information on the policy positions of each of 
the EU actors (DEU II is described in detail in Thomson et al. 2012). The DEU dataset 
focuses on controversial proposals: proposals that raised one or more controversial issues on 
which the EU legislative actors took different positions. This is an appropriate selection 
criterion for our purposes, because if the EU actors all took the same positions, there would 
be no variation in the extent to which their positions reflected stakeholders’ demands.2 
                                                        
2 The 12 legislative proposals relating to the selected consultations are the following: air 
passengers with reduced mobility (COD/2005/007); sugar production (CNS/2005/118); 
human rights agency (CNS/2005/124); Illegal immigration (COD/2005/167); payment 
services (COD/2005/245); broadcasting (COD/2005/260); waste processing 
(COD/2005/281); illegal fishing (CNS/2007/223); market authority (COD/2007/249); car 
emissions (COD/2007/297); CAP reform (CNS/2008/104); and rural development (EAFRD; 
CNS/2008/105). 
The DEU II dataset contains information on 56 legislative proposals that were passed 
after the 2014 enlargement, of which we select the 12 that were preceded by consultations for 
which the documents submitted by stakeholders were available through transparency 
requests. There were 44 legislative proposals on which there were no records of 
consultations, or for which we could only obtain summary documents that did not give details 
of each stakeholder’s demands. The 12 selected proposals do not differ markedly from the 
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 We reviewed the documents from the consultations to identify the stakeholders that 
made submissions. We identified 1,032 stakeholders that represented organisational interests 
in these consultations. We excluded a small number of submissions from individual citizens. 
Each stakeholder was categorised based on its origin (national, EU, non-EU) and group type 
(individual businesses, trade and business associations, consumer NGOs, environmental 
NGOs, other NGOs, public authorities and research institutes/think tanks). This 
categorisation was based on Bunea and Thomson’s (2015) classifications, and cross-checked 
with the transparency register and information contained within submission documents. 
 The main part of the coding matched stakeholders’ policy demands in the consultation 
documents with information on the EU actors’ (Commission, EP and member states) 
positions in the subsequent decision-making stage from the DEU II dataset. The DEU II 
dataset maps the controversial issues raised by each legislative proposal onto policy scales. 
The 12 legislative proposals included in our selection raised issues that were modelled in a 
total of 35 policy scales. This approach to representing specific political controversies 
spatially has been used to study thousands of specific policy issues in previous research on 
negotiations in national and international contexts, including the EU (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita 
and Stokman 1994; Thomson et al. 2006; Thomson 2011). It has also been adapted to study 
interest groups’ influence in the EU (Dür et al. 2015). Each issue is operationalised as a 0 to 
100 policy scale with the endpoints representing the most extreme positions taken on the 
issue by any of the actors or the most extreme outcomes under consideration. Each actor is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
other 44 proposals in the DEU II dataset with respect to a range of relevant characteristics. 
Legislative procedure: 7 of the 12 were subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), 
while the remaining five were subject to the consultation procedure; by comparison, 30 of the 
44 non-selected were subject to OLP. New or amendments to existing legislation: 7 of the 
selected 12 were new as opposed to amendments, while 27 of the non-selected 44 were new. 
Instrument type: 4 of the 12 were directives, while 19 of the 44 were directives. The selected 
12 did not differ markedly from the non-selected 44 in terms of the average numbers of 
issues raised during the decision-making stage: an average of 3.0 issues for the selected 12 
compared to 2.7 for the non-selected 44.  
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then placed at a point on the scale to represent the outcomes it favours most. The focus on 
specific policy issues is apt in the context of stakeholders’ policy demands, since these are 
specific and somewhat technical, although often highly political at the same time. 
 Figure 1 illustrates how each of the stakeholders’ demands were mapped onto the 
DEU II issues. Some of the policy scales in the DEU II dataset were adapted to either 
accommodate additional positions that were expressed by stakeholders or to merge positions 
in the original policy scales due to a lack of detailed information in the stakeholder 
submission documents. The issue depicted in the top of Figure 1 refers to the question of how 
to define which vehicles should be included in the proposed regulation on car emissions. 
During the decision stage, at which time the information on EU actors’ positions was 
assembled, two positions were identified: vehicle mass (position 0) and the vehicle footprint 
(position 100). During the preceding consultation stage, however, Friends of the Earth (Italy) 
took the position that the number of seats in the vehicle should be used. As this would mean 
the inclusion of more vehicles than the vehicle mass position, but fewer than vehicle 
footprint, a new category was created at position 50 of the policy scale. The second issue 
depicted in Figure 1 concerns an issue raised by a proposal on rural development. The 
question was about how narrowly the legislation should specify the areas on which funds 
diverted from the Common Agricultural Policy could be spent. Austria and several other 
member states wanted a broad definition, as did the Austrian Chamber of Commerce during 
the preceding consultations. The Commission and several states wanted a narrower 
definition, as did the Danish Agricultural Council during the preceding consultations. In the 
DEU II policy scale there were three positions as illustrated in the figure. However, 
stakeholders did not go into enough detail in their submissions to the consultation to be able 
to differentiate between position 80 and 100, instead referring to whether there should be any 
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restrictions on how funds should be spent. As a result, these categories were merged for the 
purposes of our analysis. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
 Figure 2 shows the two policy scales for a legislative proposal on whether to establish 
an EU agency for fundamental rights. During the decision-making stage, there were two 
controversial issues: the territorial scope of the agency and what powers it should have on 
third pillar issues. The Commission’s consultation explicitly asked stakeholders to offer 
opinions on these two issues. In the case of the territorial scope of the agency the demands 
expressed by stakeholders were identical to the range of positions at the decision-making 
stage. In the case of the powers of the agency by contrast, some stakeholders expressed 
demands for some monitoring of member states on third pillar issues, but did not support 
empowering the agency to issue opinions. 
 The types of stakeholder that made submissions to this consultation differ markedly 
from the previous two examples. The largest group of stakeholders were NGOs focusing on 
human rights, specific aspects of civil liberties, or groups such as Roma, refugees or children. 
Most NGOs preferred a narrower territorial scope for the agency, arguing that the agency 
should not duplicate the work of other human rights organisations that already offered some 
level of protection beyond that offered by member states. By contrast, these same NGOs 
were more divided on the question of whether to grant the agency greater powers. 
 One of the distinctive characteristics of this legislative proposal is that several 
member states also made submissions to the consultation. In most cases the demands they 
expressed at the formative stage were identical to the positions they adopted at the decision-
making stage. However, in the case of the agency’s powers, France, Hungary and Sweden 
 
 
 
12 
changed their positions. In their submissions to the consultation they demanded that the 
agency have no formal input into third pillar issues, but during the subsequent decision stage 
supported empowering the agency to issue opinions. 
 
[FIGURE 2] 
 
Analysis 
 
The coding of the stakeholders’ submissions revealed a total of 989 policy demands that were 
related to one of the 35 controversial issues on which we have information on the EU 
legislative actors’ positions during the subsequent decision-making stage. We have a 
maximum of 29 observations of EU actors’ positions on each of these 35 issues: one for the 
Commission, EP and each of the 27 member states (prior to the accession of Croatia). Not all 
29 EU actors took positions on each of the 35 issues. We have in total 23,234 relevant 
observations, each of which refers to a stakeholder’s demand that is matched with the 
position taken by an EU legislative actor. Each of these observations identifies the extent to 
which the stakeholder’s demand and the EU actor’s positions differed on the same issue. 
We focus mainly on the absolute distance between the stakeholders’ demands during 
the consultations and the positions taken by the EU actors during the subsequent decision 
stage. The advantage of this approach is that it maximises the amount of information in our 
analysis. The policy distances are comparable across issues in that the range of each of the 
policy scales reflects the range of the bargaining space that existed during the legislative 
negotiations on the issue. We therefore argue that the distances are sufficiently comparable in 
terms of the political distances among the alternatives. The distances are not, however, 
comparable in terms of the amount of substantive policy differences between alternatives on 
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different scales. It could be, for instance, that a distance of 100 scale points on one issue 
reflects a large policy difference on one issue, but a relatively small policy difference on 
another issue. We ran a robustness test using a dichotomous measure of whether or not the 
stakeholders’ demands agree with the positions taken by each of the EU actors, which 
produces the same results. 
 Figure 3 depicts the absolute policy distance between stakeholders’ demands and EU 
legislators’ positions by different groups of observations that correspond to the six 
hypotheses we formulated above. Table 1 provides a more rigorous test of these propositions 
by examining the effects of stakeholder origin and type in a series of regression models. We 
proceed by discussing each hypothesis in turn by referring first to Figure 3 and then to the 
relevant results from Table 1. We then report on some of the robustness tests. 
   
[FIGURE 3] 
[TABLE 1] 
 
 The first hypothesis (H1) is that the Commission is generally the most responsive 
legislator. The findings support this expectation. The first comparison in Figure 3 compares 
the average policy distance between stakeholders’ demands and the Commission’s positions 
with the same average distances for the EP and the member states in the Council. The 
average distance between stakeholders’ demands and the Commission’s positions is 42.46 
(95% confidence interval (CI): 39.64, 45.28). This is a smaller distance than the average 
distance between stakeholders’ demands and the EP’s positions at 47.41 (95% CO: 44.81, 
50.01). The fact that these confidence intervals overlap suggests that the difference is not 
large. The average distance between stakeholders’ demands and member states’ positions is 
largest at 49.95 (95% CI: 49.34, 50.56). The very narrow confidence interval for member 
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states is due to the very large number of observations. The non-parametric rank test reported 
in Figure 3 is appropriate given that these observations are not independent. The test indicates 
that the difference between these three groups of observations is significant (p=.00). 
 The first model in Table 1, which is labelled ‘All’, allows us to examine the 
difference between EU actors in terms of the distance between stakeholders’ demands and 
their positions while controlling for a range of characteristics of stakeholders, which will be 
discussed below. The variable ‘Type of legislative actor’ distinguishes between four groups 
of observations: 1) those that refer to the distance between stakeholders’ demands and 
member states’ positions for member states that were not the ‘home’ member state of the 
stakeholder concerned (the reference category); 2) those that refer to the distance between 
stakeholders and member states for states that were the home state of the stakeholder 
concerned; 3) stakeholders’ demands and Commission’s positions; 4) stakeholders’ demands 
and EP’s positions. The coefficient for the variable ‘Commission’ is negative and significant. 
The value of -7.96 indicates that the distance between stakeholders’ demands and the 
Commission’s positions is on average 7.96 policy scale points smaller than the reference 
category. Moreover, the coefficient for the Commission differs significantly from the 
coefficient for the EP (p=.00), which indicates that the Commission is on average more 
responsive than the EP. However, the coefficient for the Commission is somewhat smaller in 
absolute size than and does not differ significantly (p=.13) from the coefficient for ‘Home 
member state (if relevant)’. This lack of significance means that there is no significant 
difference between the responsiveness of the Commission to stakeholders in general, and the 
responsiveness of member states to stakeholders from their own country. 
 The second hypothesis (H2) is that all legislative actors are more responsive to 
business interests than other interests. The evidence does not support this proposition. 
Individual companies have larger policy distances to legislative actors than do trade and 
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business associations. Trade unions and professional associations also have smaller policy 
distances than do individual businesses (Figure 3). Among NGOs, consumer groups have the 
smallest policy distance, while environmental groups have the highest. The results of the first 
model in Table 2 confirm the absence of evidence of biases towards business interests. On 
the contrary, the significant negative coefficients for the variables relating to NGOs, public 
authorities and think tanks indicate that the average distances between these stakeholders’ 
demands and EU legislators’ positions are smaller than the distance for business stakeholders. 
Similar patterns are found in the results for the models of each type of EU actor, the 
Commission, EP and member states. 
Associations, some of which are business groups, make demands that are significantly 
closer to the positions of the Commission and member states than do individual 
organisations. However, some of these associations are trade unions and professional groups, 
which means that the advantage enjoyed by associations is not limited to business groups. 
The coefficient for the variable “Associations” is negative and significant in the first model 
labelled All in Table 1, and in the models for the Commission and member states. 
 The third hypothesis (H3) leads us to expect a greater distance between non-EU 
stakeholders’ demands and EU legislators’ positions compared to the same distances for EU-
wide and national stakeholders. The findings only partly support this proposition. The third 
set of comparisons in Figure 3 indeed suggest that the distance between non-EU 
stakeholders’ positions and EU actors’ positions is significantly larger than for stakeholders 
of national and EU-wide origins. However, the models in Table 2 reveal that this pattern only 
applies to member states’ positions. The Commission’s positions are significantly closer to 
the demands of non-EU stakeholders than to stakeholders of (EU) national or EU-wide 
origins. 
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 We now turn to the hypotheses that consider each EU legislative actor separately. Our 
discussion of Hypothesis 3 on non-EU stakeholders has pre-empted our findings regarding 
Hypothesis 4, which posits that the Commission is most responsive to EU-wide stakeholders. 
Contrary to this, the fourth set of comparisons in Figure 3, which focus on the Commission’s 
positions, show that the smallest distances are found for non-EU stakeholders. Moreover, the 
confidence intervals for EU-wide and national stakeholders overlap considerably. The second 
model in Table 2 confirms that there is no significant difference between the Commission’s 
responsiveness to EU-wide and (EU) national stakeholders. 
 Contrary to Hypothesis 5, the EP is no more responsive to EU-wide interests than 
other interests. This hypothesis implies that there is a smaller distance between EU-wide 
stakeholders’ demands and the EP’s positions compared to stakeholders of other origins (the 
fifth comparison in Figure 3). If fact, we find no significant differences. This non-finding is 
confirmed by the model of the EP’s positions in Table 2, where the coefficients for 
stakeholders’ origin are insignificant. 
 The evidence provides strong support for Hypothesis 6, according to which member 
states are more responsive to the demands of stakeholders from their own territories. The 
sixth and final set of comparisons in Figure 3, which focus on member states’ positions, show 
that the smallest average distance is found for stakeholders from the territory of the member 
state concerned. There are significantly larger distances for the demands of stakeholders from 
other states, EU-wide stakeholders and, as noted above, non-EU stakeholders. The model of 
member states’ positions in Table 2 also shows there is a negative and significant coefficient 
associated with the variable “Home member state”. This indicates that the distance between a 
stakeholder’s demand and a member state’s position is significantly smaller if the stakeholder 
is from the territory of the member state concerned, rather than from another other (EU) 
territory. 
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 We do not find significant and robust effects associated with our control variables, 
and the above results are robust to different model specifications. As noted above, 
stakeholders that were associations appear to have smaller average distances to EU 
legislators’ positions, although we found no effect for the EP’s positions. Having a Brussels 
office is not associated with the congruence between stakeholders’ demands and EU 
legislators’ positions. We ran a series of logit models with a dependent variable indicting 
whether or not the stakeholder’s demand and the EU legislator’s position were the same and 
obtained substantively the same results. In line with previous studies, we prefer to use the 
continuous measures that contain more information. We also ran additional models with a 
measure of the left-right position of the national governments of member states. In general, 
this did not yield significant results and did not alter the findings we report here. There were 
some subsets of cases that exhibited significant or marginally significant effects of 
governments’ left-right positions, but these were not robust or substantively important 
enough to warrant presentation. 
 
Conclusions 
Of the EU actors, the Commission is generally the most responsive to stakeholder’s demands. 
This accords with the view that the Commission is the main lobbying venue for interest 
groups, and that the Commission has a particular need for information on how policies work 
and the levels of support for different policies (Eising 2007: 387; Bouwen 2002: 379-380; 
Klüver 2013: 62). Recent research also suggests that the Commission’s legitimacy and 
influence in the decision stage is strengthened when it consults widely before introducing 
legislative proposals (Bunea and Thomson 2015). Future research could strengthen the 
inference that the Commission is the most responsive of the EU actors by attending to the 
distinction between responsiveness and congruence referred to earlier. Alternative 
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operationalisations of responsiveness could focus on the extent to which EU actors further the 
general interests of various stakeholders, as distinct from reflecting their positions in the 
decision-making stage. Furthermore, alternative research designs could examine whether the 
stakeholders that participate in consultations reflect the full range of interests affected by a 
proposal.  
 With respect to the types of stakeholders to which EU legislators are most responsive, 
we found no evidence of a bias towards business stakeholders. Instead, the type of group that 
legislative actors were most responsive to were consumer NGOs, which suggests that the EU 
gives a greater weight to stakeholders that provide information on the opinions of individual 
citizens (Mazey and Richardson 2006). In addition, we found some evidence that legislative 
actors are more responsive to associations than to individual organisations. This associational 
advantage is also consistent with resource exchange theory, although we did not identify it as 
a proposition implied by the theory. For instance, the Commission’s mandate to represent the 
broad European interest could lead it to attend more closely to associations than other 
stakeholders. Future research could expand further upon this implication of resource 
exchange theory. It is also worth examining to the impact of different types of stakeholders at 
different stages of the legislative process. This study focused on the formative stage, which 
leaves open the possibility that biases may exist in earlier or later stages of the policy process. 
The Commission is surprisingly more responsive to non-EU stakeholders than to EU 
or member state-based stakeholders. In one of the few studies to examine the participation of 
non-EU stakeholders in EU consultations, Rasmussen and Alexandrova (2012) find that 
participation is affected by level of trade between the EU and the country of origin of non-EU 
stakeholders. From the perspective of resource exchange theory, the Commission’s role as 
the EU’s external trade representative is relevant, because this gives the Commission a 
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particular need for information on the consequences of policies for the EU’s external trading 
relations. Non-EU actors are well placed to provide such information. 
 The evidence supports the expectation that member states are most responsive to 
demands from stakeholders from their own territories. National governments demand 
information on the impacts of policies in their territories and on the likely political support 
for policies in their territories. This finding also supports one of the key propositions from 
liberal intergovernmentalism, which posits that national governments define state interests in 
terms of domestic groups’ demands (Moravcsik 1997: 518). The finding provides more 
systematic support for this key proposition than previous anecdotal evidence.  
Future research could uncover the specific mechanisms underpinning different 
patterns of responsiveness identified in this study. Notwithstanding the distinct supranational 
character of the Commission, the nationalities and portfolio responsibilities of 
Commissioners play significant roles in explaining the Commission’s behaviour (Crombez 
1997; Hooghe 2005; Egeberg 2006; Wonka 2007). A pertinent question is whether the 
Commission is more responsive to stakeholders with the same national origin and sector as 
the Commissioner primarily responsible for the relevant policy area.  
In the case of the Parliament, the present study focused on the EP’s common positions 
in the first reading of the legislative proposal. These policy positions are aggregations of 
distinct positions taken within the EP, by the EP party groupings and sometimes also by 
groups of national MEPs (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007; McElroy and Benoit 2012). A recent 
study examined the policy positions of party groups and national factions in the EP on the 
same specific issues that were debated by the member states in the Council (Costello and 
Thomson 2014). This could be extended to examine the conditions under which groups 
within the EP agree with stakeholders’ demands. Such research becomes more pertinent as 
lobbyists use multiple channels to exert influence on legislative outcomes. 
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What ‘utility parameter’ should be used to define whether a vehicle is included in the 
regulation on emission standards? 
 
 
 
What should funds reallocated from the Common Agricultural Policy be spent on? 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Stakeholders’ demands and EU actors’ positions on two issues 
Note: Top issue from proposal on passenger cars (COD/2007/297), bottom issue from the proposal 
on rural development (CNS/2008/105). Not all member states took positions and not all stakeholders 
are included in the figure. AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BU: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech 
Republic; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; EL: Greece; ES: Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; 
HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LT: Lithuania; LV: Latvia; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The 
Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; SE: Sweden; UK: 
United Kingdom. ACEA: European Automobile Manufacturers Association; ANFAC: Asociation 
Espanola de Fabricantes de Automoviles y Camiones; ETSC: European Transport Safety Council; 
Pre-proposal consultation stage 
ACEA; ANFAC; 
JAMA; VDA; 
General Motors; 
Volkswagen 
Friends of the 
Earth (Italy) 
ETSC; IEW; UBA; 
Friends of the Earth (UK); 
European Federation for 
Transport and Environment 
Position 0 
Vehicle Mass 
Position 50 
Number of Seats 
Position 100 
Vehicle Footprint 
Post-proposal decision-making stage 
COM; AT; CZ; DE; 
ES; PL; RO; SK 
EP; DK; EL; FI; FR; 
IE; IT; LU; NL; SI  
Pre-proposal consultation stage 
Position 0 
Any area of rural 
development 
Position 80 
Climate change, 
water management, 
bio-energy, 
milk and innovation 
Position 100 
Climate change, 
water management, 
bio-energy 
Post-proposal decision-making stage 
AT; BU; CY; CZ; EE; 
EL; ES; HU; IE; IT; LV; 
LT; MT; PL; RO; SI; SK 
COM; LU; 
NL; PT; 
SE; UK 
Austrian Chamber of Commerce; 
Confederation of the Food and 
Drink Industries of the EU; 
Ulster Farmers Union 
Danish Agricultural Council; 
European Environmental Bureau; 
Planta Europa; 
Scottish Environment Link 
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DK; FI; 
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IEW: Inter-Environment Wallonie; JAMA: Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association; UBA: 
German Federal Environmental Agency; VDA: German Car Manufacturers Association.  
 
 
How wide should the territorial scope of the agency be defined? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How 
much 
power 
should the agency have over third pillar issues? 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stakeholders’ demands and EU actors’ positions on an EU Agency 
for Fundamental Rights 
Note: CNS/2005/124. Not all member states took positions and not all stakeholders are included in 
the figure. See figure 1 for guide to country codes. BIM: Ludwig Boltzmann Institute on Human Rights; 
CBP: Dutch Data Protection Agency; ERRC: European Roma Rights Centre; EuroMoS; European 
Monitoring System; EUMC: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia; EWL: European 
Women’s Lobby; FIDE-AE: European Association for the Protection of Human Rights; NHC: 
Netherlands Helsinki Committee.  
Pre-proposal consultation stage 
Council of Europe; 
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Amnesty International; 
ERRC; Fair Trials Abroad 
Position 100 
Fully empowered to 
give opinions and 
adjustments, including 
police and judicial 
cooperation 
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States, but no power 
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COM; EP; AT; BE; CY; CZ; 
DK; EE; EL; ES; FI; FR; HU; 
IT; LT; LV; LU; PL; PT; SE; SI 
DE; IE; MT; 
NL; SK; UK 
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Position 80 
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Amnesty International; Council of Europe; 
EuroMoS; EWL; Fair Trials Abroad; 
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Figure 3. Policy distances between stakeholders’ demands and legislative 
actors’ positions  
Note: Means (circles) and 95% confidence intervals (bars), n (All)= 23,234. P-values refer to non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis rank test of differences among groups. Numbers in parentheses refer to the 
numbers of observations. 
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Table 1. Factors affecting the distance between stakeholders’ demands and 
legislative actors’ positions (Commission, European Parliament and Member 
States) 
 All Commission EP Member 
States 
 b (s.e.) p b (s.e.) p b (s.e.) p b (s.e.) p 
Characteristics of 
legislator 
        
Type of legislative 
actor (reference: 
“other” member 
states) 
        
   Home member 
state (if relevant) 
-11.52 (1.77) .00     -11.35 (1.77) .00 
   Commission -7.96 (1.72) .00       
   EP -3.03 (1.65) .07       
 
Characteristics of 
stakeholder 
        
Origin (reference: 
national within EU) 
        
   EU-level -1.08 (2.46) .66 -1.62 (4.38) .71 3.24 (4.07) .43 -1.25 (2.66) .64 
   Non-EU 
 
8.66 (3.23) .01 -20.93 (5.02) .00 -4.62 (4.87) .35 10.77 (3.57) .00 
Type (reference: 
business) 
        
   Trade union and 
professional 
-2.68(2.95) .36 1.43 (7.51) .85 -9.25 (7.24) .20 -2.51 (3.17) .43 
   NGO -6.69 (2.80) .02 -15.12 (4.56) .00 -14.19 (4.01) .00 -5.96 (3.07) .05 
   Public authorities -12.79 (3.04) .00 -7.21 (4.47) .11 -5.42 (3.78) .15 -13.35 (3.35) .00 
   Research institutes 
and think tanks 
 
-12.38 (4.87) .01 -18.79 (9.07) .04 -15.28 (9.15) .10 -11.98 (5.17) .02 
Association 
(business and trade 
unions) 
-7.46 (3.10) .02 -8.79 (4.46) .05 4.26 (3.63) .24 -7.93 (3.41) .02 
Brussels office -1.25 (2.36) .60 -3.94 (4.24) .35 .97 (4.07) .81 -1.23 (2.56) .63 
Constant 57.77 (2.60) .00 53.91 (3.41) .00 50.80 (2.56) .00 57.73 (2.83) .00 
F (p) 7.95 (.00)  4.93 (.00)  3.81 (.00)  8.73(.00)  
n observations (n 
stakeholder 
demands) 
23,234 (989)  989 (989)  984 (984)  21,261 (989)  
Note: Dependent variable is the distance between each stakeholder’s demand and the position of 
each legislative actor. OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered by stakeholders’ 
demands. 
